Will Igor Sechin and Alexey Miller be held accountable for crimes against Ukrainian children

As early as March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in connection with thedeportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children. As of today, approximately 20,000 children have been identified as having been deported or forcibly transferred. At the same time, the actual scale is likely significantly higher.

Back in 2022, I emphasized that this is one of those crimes that leaves an extensive “trail”: documents, lists, transfer routes, public statements.Therefore, there are strong prospects for identifying and holding those responsible accountable at all levels. Today, another dimension of this issue has come to the forefront – the role Russian state-owned corporations. The report by the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab, which conducted truly extensive work, allows for a more concrete discussion of this aspect. 

According to the findings, entities affiliated with Gazprom and Rosneft were involved in the transfer and subsequent accommodation of at least 2,158 children from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine between 2022 and 2025. This concerns children taken from the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions to the children camps in Russia and occupied Crimea. Part of this infrastructure is linked to entities associated with Gazprom and Rosneft. What matters is not only the transfers themselves, but also how they were organized. Affiliated companies arranged transportation, financed trips through camp voucher systems, and involved children in programs aimed at promoting pro-Russian narratives and erasing Ukrainian identity. In several camps elements of militarization have also been documented.

Taken together, these facts indicate not episodic business involvement, but rather the systemic integration of corporate structures into a process that bears the hallmarks of an international crime – namely, complicity. Historically, international law has already addressed similar situations. 

After World War II, the Nuremberg Trials prosecuted not only political and military leaders, but also executives of major industrial groups. For example, in the Krupp case before U.S. military tribunals, twelve top executives, including Alfried Krupp, were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, particularly for the use of forced labor, deportation of civilians for labor, and exploitation of occupied territories. 

Eleven of the twelve defendants were convicted. Alfried Krupp was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment with confiscation of property, while others received sentences ranging from three to twelve years. The court emphasized that liability arose not from business activity as such, but from managerial decisions through which corporate resources were used to commit international crimes.

These cases established a key principle: international courts hold individuals accountable, but assess their actions within the context of the corporate structures they lead. International crimes are carried out not only through the use of force, but also through access to resources, infrastructure, and organizational capacity. This logic is reflected in contemporary practice. 

In Sweden, criminal proceedings are ongoing against former executives of Lundin Energy, who are accused of complicity in war crimes committed in Sudan.

According to the prosecution, the company’s managerial decisions facilitated operations involving violence against civilians. The case is being heard under the principle of universal jurisdiction and is seen as one of the first attempts in Europe to hold top executives criminally accountable for international crimes.

In France, proceedings concerning the activities of Lafarge in Syria have become a landmark case for assessing corporate involvement in crimes against humanity. Investigations established that between 2012 and 2014, the company made payments to armed groups, including those committing international crimes, to maintain operations of a cement plant. 

French courts concluded that company leadership could have been aware of the nature of these groups and nevertheless continued engagement. This element of knowledge, combined with material support, formed the basis for charges of complicity in crimes against humanity.

If historical examples demonstrate the consequences of supporting international crimes, the situation involving Russian state-owned corporations points to conscious complicity and a significant contribution to their commission. When such structures are not merely transporting or hosting children, but actively participating in their ideological re-education, militarization, and erasure of Ukrainian identity, this raises a far more serious legal assessment. 

Under Article II of the Genocide Convention, the transfer of children from one group to another with the intent of assimilation may constitute an act of genocide. In this context, corporate structures facilitating these processes – through infrastructure, financing, and organization – may be regarded as participants in a mechanism aimed at the destruction of a group not only physically, but also through the elimination of its future.

It is therefore essential to assess potential accountability in two dimensions. The first is sanctions. This is a tool that can be implemented relatively quickly. While some structures affiliated with Gazprom and Rosneft are already under sanctions, the report shows that this is clearly insufficient. Researchers identified 44 entities involved in the transfer and accommodation of Ukrainian children, including subsidiaries, affiliated organizations, and executives. Approximately 80% of them are not currently subject to U.S. or EU sanctions, indicating significant gaps in the sanctions regime that require expansion. 

The second dimension is criminal liability. This is a more complex and long-term process, but one of fundamental importance. The report should be considered by the International Criminal Court, which is already addressing the deportation of Ukrainian children. Its jurisdiction extends to individuals, meaning that senior executives – including Igor Sechin and Alexey Miller – should be examined as potential suspects. It is also necessary to investigate the role of managers across all involved levels, including subsidiaries and affiliated structures. There are also grounds for action at the national level. The report provides sufficient material to initiate criminal proceedings and potentially pursue asset seizures abroad. Instruments of universal jurisdiction should likewise be considered, given their demonstrated effectiveness.

Ultimately, the key conclusion from this report is a further confirmation that the deportation of Ukrainian children is part of a systemic state policy of the Russian Federation, implemented across multiple levels – from political and military leadership to major state corporations and their affiliated structures.