EU Defense Commissioner Kubilius: Trump’s approach to peace talks only made Putin stronger

— You have recently stated that the EU could greatly increase its military support to Ukraine if Putin isn't convinced by Trump's efforts to make peace. Could you expand on your thought and explain how exactly you see this being implemented?

— Well, first of all, definitely, that support which is given by the European Union and the United States till now was quite a big one. But when we are looking into real numbers, it appears that annually we were giving by both sides approximately 20 billion euros’ worth of weapons, which means that this is now below 0.4% of our GDP, either American or European.

What I put into my Twitter, I said very simply that if we would use that money procuring weapons from Ukrainian industry, it would immediately increase the outcome of our support by two times, because production of weapons in Ukraine—very modern weapons, very advanced weapons—is two times cheaper than production in the European Union or United States. So this is an easy way how we can increase material support, how we can make two times more weapons donated to Ukraine, using the same amount of money.

But in addition to that, we are now working very intensively, and I was talking during those days with the Prime Minister, with different ministers, on a new program of the European Union to support defense industries in the whole European Union, including also Ukraine—so-called SAFE loans [Security Action for Europe]—which are very attractive loans. 150 billion euros is the whole amount. And I think that those loans, taken by member states and used to have joint procurement with Ukraine—from Ukraine and for Ukraine—can be really some kind of breakthrough on the level of our military support.

So we still need to work on that, but I hope that this is really a new opportunity, which we need to use most effectively.

— You're right that producing weapons in Ukraine is cheaper, but do you believe that those weapons can substitute for weapons from Western countries?

— Well, at least what we learned again, being here in Ukraine, in Kyiv—and we met with the President’s Office, military advisers, with Minister Umerov, with Vice Prime Minister Fedorov—we saw the production of drones, and we even participated in testing them, and I would make a very simple conclusion: Ukraine is showing that the war is changing very dramatically.

What weapons are used in the war also are changing very dramatically. And it's very clear that drones now and unmanned different vehicles are playing a crucial role in how wars are going on. And here Ukraine really is able to produce the most modern, the most qualified weaponry, and that is what even we in Europe need to learn from Ukraine. And that is why the question of what kind of weapons Ukraine is still not able to produce is becoming more and more narrow. Definitely we need to look at how we can provide Ukraine with modern air defense systems. But even in that area, as we understood, Ukraine is developing its own technologies, which can be very effective and which can come very soon. Still, perhaps there are some weapons which we need to procure outside of Ukraine, but that will not play the most important role in how the war will go on.

— So it looks like you expect that Ukraine will also be producing air defense systems maybe sometime later?

— At least we have got that kind of information. We haven't seen, but there was such information.

— But it's high technology. I believe it takes a lot of years to produce them.

— Well, again, I cannot give any kind of more precise information, but we are speaking about possibilities of next year.

— As I understand, as European Commissioner for Defense and Space, you also negotiate with other European countries to increase their aid to Ukraine. So which countries are the most difficult to convince? I think that for Baltic countries it is easier to understand the need. But for such countries as Spain, for instance, it's probably harder.

— It's visible. Now you can look into statistics, which is available and made by different institutions. For example, the German Kiel Institute is providing very precise information about how much different EU member states are giving support to Ukraine. And definitely we can see very clearly the difference. If the Nordic countries, Baltic countries are really giving a lot—calculating the percentage of GDP—then some other countries are giving a very limited amount of support. And that is why the average support from European Union member states—if you calculate all the member states, how much they are giving in aggregated numbers—is below 0.4% of GDP of the whole European Union, which is shockingly low numbers, I would say.

Because now European Union member states and NATO member states are discussing—and perhaps in June, during the NATO summit, there will be an agreement—that NATO member states, for their defense, will have an obligation to spend around 3.5% of their GDP. Now they are spending around 2%, then they will increase. So for our own defense, we are ready to spend 3.5% of GDP, but for Ukraine we are giving only 0.4%. For me, I do not see here some kind of military logic, because it's obvious that now Ukraine is defending the whole of Europe. And Europeans are ready to spend for their own defense improvement 3%, when we know that Ukraine is defending us, and we are giving to Ukraine only 0.4%.

— What arguments do you use for those countries who don't want to raise their aid to Ukraine?

— I am using very simple arguments: to read or listen to the predictions of intelligence services of your countries—like, for example, the German intelligence service or Danish intelligence service—which recently again predicted that Russia can be ready to make an aggressive attack against NATO member states, against EU member states, during the next three to five years. So if we want to avoid that, if we want to deter Putin, we need not only to increase our own defense capabilities, but we need to substantially increase our support to Ukraine. And that is why I am talking about those SAFE loans—that they can be some kind of new possibility, which member states should use in order to really strengthen Ukrainian capabilities to defend not only Ukraine itself, but also to defend ourselves.

— How do you estimate Donald Trump's peace efforts over the past three months? Do you believe they could realistically bring peace?

— Well, first of all, I do not see that Putin is really ready for any serious negotiations on peace. And Putin is in some way, I would say, playing games. In some cases, it looks like he enjoys what I would call trolling the Washington administration. And perhaps this time was spent for Trump to learn what Putin is about. So for the time being, I do not see real progress in those negotiations. Which is sad, because definitely all of us want peace for Ukraine. But that peace can be achieved only through the implementation of the formula which everybody calls “peace through strength.” And first of all, we need to take care about strength—and the strength of Ukraine—which can be increased only by increasing support from the European Union and the United States.

It was not done before starting the discussions about negotiations. And that is why, politically, my evaluation is that Putin became stronger during this period of so-called negotiations. And he is really not showing any signal that he is ready for any serious negotiations.

— But it seems that Trump does not understand this. Why do you think Donald Trump expects more concessions from Ukraine than from Russia? At least in his public statements.

— Well, again, for us it may be difficult to understand. And definitely it would be much better if from the very beginning the United States administration would be able to show that they see the difference between the aggressor and the victim of Russia. But the tactic which was chosen by President Trump and his administration was to treat both sides more or less equally: “It is not clear who is guilty,” and so on. Which, again, strengthens Putin's position—not Ukraine’s. And it is difficult to comment on why such a tactic was chosen—to promise Russia good relations between the United States and Russia after peace will be established, despite the fact that aggressor Putin will stay in power. I think, again, this is quite difficult to understand. And that is why Putin was enjoying such an approach from the United States.

— At what stage are the discussions about sending peacekeepers to Ukraine? Can you tell us about some specific agreements?

— Well, this is done by member states. We are not really discussing those issues on the commissioner level. But those member states who are initiating such kinds of security guarantees after peace will be established—like France, like Germany, with participation of Great Britain—they are inviting us to be with them together. I consider this initiative very important. And I hope that it will be finalized in a proper way. If there will be really established peace, we need to be part of the implementation of that peace agreement—with very clear guarantees that Russia will not be allowed to violate that agreement. We need to avoid the scenario of Minsk-2 or Minsk-3 in this case.

— According to The Times, Europe currently lacks the resources to field a 25,000-strong European contingent in Ukraine. Is this true?

— Well, again, it is for member states to decide how much they are able to provide and what resources they have. In theory, Europeans have quite a sufficient number—what they declare as the number of their military power. But they need to calculate what resources they can really deliver for those security guarantees in Ukraine. And in any case, I hope that discussions and negotiations at the end will be fruitful. The question is how that can be implemented. Somebody is speaking about air surveillance systems—that the West can come with strong surveillance systems from airplanes, and so on. Well, that’s what the military knows better—what is needed for such kind of operation.

— It is known that Russia produces more weapons in three months than all NATO members in a year. How long will it take for the NATO members to reach this level of production as Russia has?

— That calculation—that Russians are producing more in three months than all NATO member states, including the United States, Great Britain, and all European members of NATO, are able to produce in one year—is repeated publicly by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte quite often. That’s why we need to trust him. Now, definitely, we are looking for all the possibilities of how we can ramp up our production. That is why, in the Commission, we recently approved the so-called White Paper on the future of European defense, and also the whole Rearm Europe 2030 program, which brings a lot of new financial resources. And we need very clearly to have a target: that before 2030, we need to have much bigger numbers in our defense industry production and much bigger numbers of weapons, which we can use in order to defend ourselves and deter Putin’s aggression.

— Does the creation of your position as European Commissioner for Defense and Space mean that eventually the EU may try to form its own NATO without the U.S.?

— Well, first of all, the creation of the portfolio of Commissioner for Defense and Space means that European leaders understood from the experience of the war against Ukraine, and also from knowledge about possible Russian plans, that we need to strengthen our defense capabilities very rapidly. That was why there was an agreement to create a Defense Commissioner. And that was why member states agreed also on what they call the “big bang” approach—to increase defense spending very rapidly, to find new financial resources. And that is what we are doing.

Now, it's related, first of all, to how we evaluate the threats of Russian invasion. But looking into the longer-term future, again, I am repeating that always—we need to see, because of China’s rise in military power, Americans during the next decade will shift more and more of their military resources to the Indo-Pacific and will diminish their presence in European NATO. And that is why we need to be ready to take responsibility for European defense onto our own shoulders. And that is why we are also talking about the new European security architecture, which we cannot imagine without Ukraine being part of it.