Exclusive: Ukrainian troops recall moment they invaded Russian territory

In the pre-dawn darkness of Aug. 6, 2024, several Ukrainian military columns, along with their equipment, began moving from the forests of Sumy Oblast toward Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

Thus began the boldest and largest cross-border raid by Ukraine’s Defense Forces — the first ground invasion of Russian territory since World War II.

Among the lead assault units was the 225th Assault Regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, still officially a battalion at the time.

These soldiers were the first to “punch a hole” through the Russian border, unit commander Oleh “Sirko” Shyriaiev told NV. For his actions during the operation, he would later be awarded the title Hero of Ukraine.

In the days leading up to the offensive, his troops barely slept — laying communications lines, preparing evacuation plans, drones, artillery, and rehearsing the routes. They scouted the paths on foot, marked key points, and identified enemy positions. To ensure everything went according to plan on the day of the assault, Shyriaiev placed his own personnel in the vehicles assigned to the battalion.

At dawn on Aug. 6, the assault column moved out.

“We built the convoy as follows,” Shyriaiev explained. “In front was our unarmored pickup truck with soldiers. Behind it was a tank, followed by a Wisent mine-clearing vehicle based on the Leopard tank chassis.”

The convoy halted two kilometers from the border. The minefield ahead, which stretched toward a Russian anti-tank trench, was cleared by the Wisent, while the tank maneuvered to a flank and began firing into the bushes, where earlier recon missions had spotted Russian ambushes.

“At the same time, our artillery, smoke cover, and airstrikes kicked in,” said Shyriaiev. “The Wisent did its job and pulled back. Then an IMR engineering vehicle rolled in and filled in the trench.”

The soldiers in the pickup crossed the trench using ladders, cut through steel cables with grinders, and snipped through barbed wire with large bolt cutters. After that, the specialized equipment advanced to clear more mines and fill the next trench.

At that moment, the infantry received the order to advance.

“That’s when we broke into Russia,” Shyriaiev added. “I entered with 400 infantrymen and 21 combat vehicles.”

According to his estimates, around 10,000 Ukrainian troops participated in the Kursk operation overall.

Another breach point near the Sudzha border checkpoint was taken by paratroopers from the 80th Brigade and fighters from the 33rd Assault Regiment. Two other planned breakthroughs failed.

One paratrooper who took part in the operation told NV anonymously that by 7 a.m. his unit had reached its designated location inside Kursk Oblast.

“By 7:30, we had taken our first prisoners,” he said enthusiastically. “They were conscripts — Kadyrov’s troops. They had no idea what to do or where to run, so they just gave up.”

He added that while some Russian forces fought at close range, most surrendered quickly. “Kadyrov’s men are known as TikTok troops,” he explained. “There were also FSB officers, but they fled as well.”

Shyriaiev’s stormtroopers also captured prisoners.

Rather than attacking enemy strongpoints head-on, the Ukrainians bypassed and hit them from the rear.

“We advanced 10 kilometers in a day,” said the 225th Regiment commander. “The enemy wasn’t prepared for this.”

The silent invasion

During the first 24 hours, Russian authorities remained silent about the Ukrainian incursion. Later, they claimed the “Ukrainian sabotage-reconnaissance group” had already “retreated to its own territory.”

But Ukrainian troops kept pushing forward at speed, and photos and videos of Ukrainian soldiers in Russian territory flooded social media, making it impossible for Russia’s Defense Ministry to deny the offensive.

On Aug. 7, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin convened his military leadership in response to the situation in Kursk Oblast, calling it a “major provocation.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova also urged the international community to “strongly condemn the criminal attacks of the Kyiv regime on Russian territory.”

For the first few days, Ukraine made no official statements about its actions in Kursk. On Aug. 10, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indirectly referenced the operation, describing it as “pushing the war onto the aggressor’s territory.”

It wasn’t until Aug. 12 that Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi publicly confirmed the offensive in Kursk Oblast.

By that point, Ukrainian forces had reportedly seized nearly 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory.

A shocking plan

Top commanders learned about the operation’s planning in late July. Shyriaiev said he heard specific details for the first time 10 days before the assault, directly from Syrskyi.

A secret coordination meeting followed, where participating brigades were briefed on their missions. Attendees included the commanders of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces — namely the 80th, 82nd, and 95th Brigades — as well as the 21st and 22nd Mechanized Brigades, the 103rd Territorial Defense Brigade, and commanders of the Special Operations Forces and assault battalions, including the 33rd and 225th.

Syrskyi personally designed the operation.

“He was fully briefed on the intel,” Shyriaiev said. “I’m a realist. I started this war as a soldier. I know what it means to sit in trenches. And I can tell when someone understands the battlefield and knows where each brigade is and what’s happening. Syrskyi had full command of the situation.”

But for some commanders, Syrskyi’s plan came as a shock — including Lieutenant Colonel Artem Kholodkevych, chief of staff of the 61st Mechanized Brigade, who later described his reaction to The Wall Street Journal.

Syrskyi reportedly told them, “Ukraine is about to switch roles with Russia.”

In a later interview with the YouTube channel Bombardyr, Syrskyi acknowledged that not all commanders were mentally prepared to cross into Russian territory. Some believed it might be illegal.

“I personally met with every company, every soldier,” Syrskyi said. “We didn’t have a massive force. We went in with fewer troops than during the Kharkiv operation.”

It appears Syrskyi failed to convince everyone.

In late July — before the operation began — Colonel Emil Ishkulov, commander of the 80th Separate Air Assault Brigade, was relieved of duty. Media reports at the time mentioned a conflict with the command but didn’t specify the reason. A few days later, the reason became clear.

Breakthrough

The 225th Assault Battalion began approaching the staging area for the operation on July 26. Troop transports mostly arrived under cover of night and immediately took positions in wooded areas about 20 kilometers from the border.

The upcoming attack was planned down to the smallest detail. Every vehicle was equipped with Garmin GPS navigators, printed route maps, and backup navigation tools. Officers carried route plans that specified every turn and landmark down to the kilometer.

Following a successful breach of the Russian border, the 225th Battalion advanced toward the town of Novoivanivka, with paratroopers from the 82nd Brigade moving in behind them.

In the first weeks of the operation, Ukraine’s Armed Forces pushed 25–35 kilometers deep into Russian territory in three main directions: south toward Kursk (via Sudzha), center toward Lgov, and north toward Korenovo (via Dariyino and Novoivanivka).

One member of the 80th Air Assault Brigade, speaking on condition of anonymity, recalled that after covering 10 kilometers on enemy ground, Ukrainian paratroopers began the assault on the town of Sudzha. The attack involved the 80th and 83rd Brigades, the 33rd Assault Battalion, and other units.

The first photos and videos of Ukrainian soldiers in Sudzha emerged on Aug. 9, the fourth day of the operation. In one video, troops from the 61st Mechanized Brigade reported that the town was calm and under their control, including a strategic Gazprom facility.

On Aug. 14, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian troops had cleared Sudzha of enemy forces.

Meanwhile, the 225th Battalion, which had taken Novoivanivka on the first day, continued advancing toward Korenovo. Their mission was to block the town, which required a rapid 20-kilometer push on Aug. 7, the second day of the operation.

Support came from Ukraine’s SBU security service, which deployed a reconnaissance aircraft to accompany the column—led by a tank and four IFVs. This aerial “eye” guided the unit across open fields, avoiding highways monitored by the enemy.

Shyriaiev, the battalion’s commander, had earlier realized the fields weren’t mined, as crops were still growing.

“We just hit them in the flank and immediately took them out,” Shyriaiev recalled. “And we got ourselves internet—took their phones, set up a Wi-Fi hotspot, and started receiving mission updates online. We gathered there and sealed off Korenovo.”

The Russian troops retreated, with Ukrainian forces now effectively operating behind enemy lines.

A different brigade later replaced Shyriaiev’s men near Korenovo, while the 225th repositioned along the Krepena River.

Over the following days, his unit cleared several more villages and wooded areas, handing control over to the 41st Brigade.

By late August, the DeepState monitoring group reported that Russian forces had retaken Korenovo.

Warning signs

In mid-August 2024, Ukrainian forces opened a fourth front in the Kursk region, launching a fresh assault toward the village of Hlushkovo, west of Korenovo. This was led by another breach of the border by Shyriaiev’s assault troops.

Only 2.5 kilometers separated Ukrainian forces from Hlushkovo, but they never entered the village. Instead, they transferred control of the captured territory to a rear-guard brigade.

“This is when things started to fall apart,” Shyriaiev recalled. “The enemy began reinforcing with combat-ready units.”

By the end of August, Ukrainian forces had seized around 1,300 square kilometers of Russian territory. But on Sept. 10, Moscow deployed some of its most elite units to the area and launched a counteroffensive. Western intelligence began reporting Russian advances.

By late September, the situation for Ukrainian troops had worsened significantly. By mid-October, estimates indicated Russia had massed between 30,000 and 45,000 troops in Kursk—up from just 5,000–10,000 at the operation’s start.

On Oct. 10, reports emerged of the first mass execution of Ukrainian troops in Kursk: Russian forces shot nine Ukrainian drone operators.

Holding the line

Around this time, Ukraine’s command deployed the 47th Brigade to the region. The brigade had been resting in Kryvyi Rih after grueling battles near Pokrovsk. But within weeks, they were sent to the Kursk front.

Vitaliy “Woody” Bilovol, a mortar platoon commander with the 47th’s 1st Mechanized Battalion, recalled his grim first impression of Kursk: a nearby field strewn with dead cows killed by landmines, the stench lingering in the air. Similar scenes dotted the border area.

Bilovol’s unit was sent to reinforce positions around Novoivanivka, replacing a brigade that had fallen apart.

“When we arrived, the situation was already tough,” he said. “A few days earlier, Russian assault teams had infiltrated tree lines and thickets. Our task was to defend Novoivanivka, Oleksandriya, and Leonidove [neighboring villages]. We engaged in fighting right away. Just two days in, we lost our first soldier—our brother Pryvyd [‘Ghost’].”

Pryvyd’s mortar team had walked into an ambush. The brigade had unknowingly entered uncleared territory. The enemy, just 300 meters away, opened fire on troops hiding in a house. A bullet slipped under Pryvyd’s body armor, hitting him in the liver.

“He died within five minutes,” Bilovol said. “The others pulled back, but his body remained in the burning house. It burned down with him inside.”

Later, Bilovol recovered only a few fragments of Pryvyd’s femur from the ashes.

Bilovol said his mortar battery of about 35 men lost eight troops in Kursk. Another battery from the same brigade suffered similar losses.

“Before this, we only had wounded—never fatalities,” he said. “In a year and a half of service, everyone always came back alive.”

Another mortar commander from the 47th, callsign “Druid,” told NV the situation worsened dramatically in November. Supplying positions with ammo and food became nearly impossible as Russia intensified drone and glide-bomb attacks, and troop numbers surged to 50,000—including 11,000 North Korean soldiers, according to Ukrainian officials.

The North Korean assaults, Bilovol said, echoed tactics from World War II.

“Groups of 150 would charge across open fields under a war cry,” he recalled. “At first, I thought it was madness. But if you don’t care about losses, it works. Our positions were held by just 2–3 men. When 20–30 attackers rush you, you just can’t hold it.”

Russia also attacked from the flanks, unleashing drones, bombs, and artillery barrages on Ukrainian positions.

By year’s end, Ukraine’s territorial gains in Kursk had shrunk to roughly 460 square kilometers.

By January 2025, Russia had secured fire control over Ukraine’s key supply route: the Sumy–Yunakivka–Sudzha highway.

“The roads were 100% under Russian control, so any attempt to move in or out meant almost certain death,” Druid recalled. “We had to walk over 20 kilometers. That took a huge toll.”

Bilovol’s battery had similar experiences. With logistics cut off, drone crews were grounded—no drones, no fuel to charge batteries.

“That’s when the end of our story in Kursk began,” Bilovol said.

Another soldier involved in the operation, speaking anonymously to NV, blamed both Russian strength and Ukrainian missteps.

“Yes, the Russians threw in enormous numbers of troops, drones, artillery, glide bombs,” he said. “But our command also failed to plan for logistics disruption and didn’t react quickly enough.”

Russia had probed for weak spots, he said. Once they found them, Ukraine didn’t respond adequately.

“It wasn’t so much that the brigades were weak,” the soldier said, “but that planning was flawed.”

A costly retreat

Mykola Bielieskov, senior analyst at the Come Back Alive Foundation, believes Russia would have eventually pushed Ukraine out of Kursk regardless. Russian forces had the advantage in numbers and equipment, showed no concern for losses, carpet-bombed Sudzha, and deployed fiber-optic drones immune to electronic warfare.

“Our task,” the expert said, “was to make them pay the highest possible price.”

Shyriaiev said the Kursk operation forced Russia to redeploy elite units from the Zaporizhzhya front, disrupting its southern offensive.

“Maybe some of our reserve units lost positions in Kursk,” the officer added, “but they killed the enemy. Every meter we gained cost the Russians men and machines.”

According to him, Ukrainian forces destroyed two of the four North Korean brigades involved in the fighting.

“A lot of armchair critics ask, ‘Why did we even launch the Kursk operation?’” he said. “But without it, Russia would’ve been on the offensive.”

The final days

By late February 2025, Bilovol said it became clear Ukrainian forces wouldn’t hold the Kursk bridgehead.

“The Russians took Sverdlykovo [a small border village], turning our positions into a trap,” he recalled.

“That’s when command decided to pull out—to avoid needless deaths,” added a paratrooper who spoke with NV anonymously.

On or around March 11, reports emerged that Russian troops had entered the critical town of Sudzha. Two days later, Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed full control of the town.

The next day, President Zelenskyy declared the operation had achieved its goals, though the situation was “very difficult.” Two days after that, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed the withdrawal from Sudzha.

By early April, NV sources in NATO said Ukraine had lost 90% of the territory it had captured in Kursk.

On April 26, Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov announced that Moscow had “liberated” the final village in the region—Hornal.

However, Ukraine’s General Staff denied Russian claims that the fighting in Kursk was over. DeepState reported the operation was still ongoing.

On May 21, Zelenskyy said Ukraine’s Armed Forces were continuing combat operations in Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.

According to NV’s sources in Ukraine’s defense forces, by early June, Ukrainian troops still held parts of the border area in Kursk, though in some sectors, they were already fighting on the Ukrainian side. In other areas, Russian forces had entered Sumy Oblast.

As of late April, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Russia had lost 62,400 troops during the Kursk operation—25,200 killed and 36,200 wounded. An additional 983 Russian soldiers were captured.

Ukrainian losses have not been disclosed.

While critics argue Ukraine should’ve focused its forces on the embattled Pokrovsk front in Donetsk, Bielieskov said the Kursk operation yielded major strategic gains.

“Given the amount of Russian personnel and equipment destroyed, the damage was significant,” he explained. “And Russia couldn’t just sit by while part of its ‘sovereign’ territory was taken. That’s a strong argument in favor of the operation.”